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Following the Succession Wars of the early eighteenth-century, political economists across Italy discussed 
a range of possible reforms. Among the issues drawing most attention was the complicated problem 
whether devaluation policies were appropriate means for boosting economic growth. Not only did the issue 
raise moral and juridical questions, it also triggered profound historical reflections on the evolution of 
‘commercial societies’ out of feudal systems. This article places a number of Italian mid-eighteenth-
century ideas of money in their original context of political and intellectual challenges and attempts to 




1. Economic decline and the options for reform: the main ideological divide  
Around 1750, after the wars of the big Succession Crises of the first half of the century, a number 
of lawyers, merchants, bankers and political advisors across Italy saw themselves confronted 
with the challenge to develop strategies for the revival of Italy’s commerce.  
At the time, the economy of the Italian peninsula was seriously underdeveloped, 
compared with other parts of Europe, for which there were a number of reasons. During the 
Spanish, Austrian and Polish Succession Crises, Italy had been a main battleground. 
Contemporary observers, such as the Neapolitan Ferdinando Galiani and the Milanese 
government official Gian Rinaldo Carli, noted that although the wars that were fought across 
Italy had attracted money, they had also upset the population distribution and the normal 
processes of economic growth.2 The influx of foreign currencies during this period resulted in 
great monetary confusion, which harmed the efficiency of domestic markets.3 
Moreover, while the Kingdom of Naples had become independent in 1734 under Charles 
of Bourbon, and Tuscany had a new reform government under Francis Stephen and, later, Peter 
Leopold, in the north of the country the political-military situation was not stable yet after the 
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2nd Workshop on the History of Economics at the Certosa 
di Pontignano, near Siena, in November 2004. I benefited from comments by Donald Winch, Marco Guidi, 
Philippe Steiner, Roberto Romani, Giovanni Pavanelli and Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, as well as by two 
anonymous referees. 
2 GIAN RINALDO CARLI, Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, parts I and VI, in Scrittori Classici Italiani di 
Economia, Edizione moderna (ed. by P. Custodi, Milan, 1804), pp. 357-66, see also GIAN RINALDO CARLI, 
Opere (Vol. XIII, Milan, 1784-7), pp. 55-6, cited by G. FELLONI, Il mercato monetario in Piemonte nel secolo 
XVIII (Milan, 1968), pp. 12-3. FERDINANDO GALIANI, Della moneta e scritti inediti (eds. Alberto Caracciolo & 
Alberto Merola, Milan, 1963), p. 8. 
3 GALIANI, Della moneta, pp. 8-9. 
 peace of Aix-La-Chapelle of 1748. The Austrian authorities in Italy, eager to expand their rule to 
the west and south, struggled to maintain the economic order in their Lombard territory, while 
suffering from the poor state of Austrian finances. Simultaneously, the former realm of Savoy, 
now the Kingdom of Sardinia, under Charles Emmanuel III, in turn, posed a threat to Genua’s 
independence. 
Finally, the economies of Italy had been declining during the seventeenth century. 
Manufacturing industries increasingly failed to compete with much cheaper and more fashionable 
northern-European goods. As a result of high labour costs, outdated institutional organisation 
(industries were often still ruled by guilds) and relatively high taxes, Italian exports went down 
and the country increasingly became dependent upon its agricultural sector.4 While imports of 
manufactured (luxury) goods rose, this put the balance of trade under pressure, which caused 
governments to alleviate the pressure by devaluing the coin.5 Thus, Italy lost its position, which it 
established during the Renaissance, as a dominant manufacturing country and became an 
exporter mainly of primary products. Consequently, by becoming an old-fashioned agricultural 
economy, a class of landed property holders assumed political power, which drove Italy back into 
feudal structures.6 
In order to turn the tide, a number of eminent reformers across Italy examined the 
possibilities for small Italian states to develop their economies by means of financial policies by 
tuning into the main European currents of thought.7 The English recoinage crisis of the 1690s, in 
which John Locke was understood to be the main opponent to a proposed devaluation8, and, even 
more so, the French debate on finances in the aftermath of the collapse of John Law’s 
revolutionary Mississippi Scheme, produced a wide range of ideas about how economic growth 
could be stimulated politically. 
The most influential, as well as controversial, work in this French context was Melon’s 
                                                          
4 CARLO CIPOLLA, ‘The economic decline of Italy’, in: Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (ed. Brian Pullan, London, 1968), pp. 127-45. T. WAHNBAECK, Luxury and 
Public Happiness: Political Economy in the Italian Enlightenment (Oxford, 2004), pp. 83-5, 138-40, 154. D. 
CARPANETTO & G. RICUPERATI, Italy in the Age of Reason (London, 1987), chapters 1-5, D. SELLA, Italy in the 
seventeenth century (London 1997). 
5 CARLO CIPOLLA, Le avventure della lira (Milan, 1958), pp. 63-4. 
6 CIPOLLA, ‘The economic decline of Italy’, pp. 142-5. 
7 The most important study of this debate is still FRANCO VENTURI, ‘Il dibattito sulle monete’, Settecento 
riformatore, Da Muratori a Beccaria (vol. I, Turin, 1969), pp. 443-552. See also U. TUCCI, ‘Moneta e riforme 
monetarie nell’Italia del settecento’, Rivista Storica Italiana (1986), pp. 78-119, M. AMATO, ‘Dal “dibattito sulle 
monete” al Della moneta: riforme, monete, calcolo e intelletto da Muratori e Beccaria a Galiani’, Rivista Storica 
Italiana (1996), pp. 836-56, C. CAPRA, ‘Riforme finanziarie e mutamento istituzionale nello Stato di Milano: gli 
anni sessanta del secolo XVIII’, Rivista Storica Italiana (1979), pp. 313-68. 
8 J. LOCKE, Locke on money (ed. Patrick Kelly, II Vols., Oxford, 1991). 
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 Essai politique sur le commerce (1734, 1st edition).9 The book was the fruit of an analysis of how 
France could overcome the enduring negative effects of seventeenth-century politics on the 
state’s finances under Louis XIV and Colbert. Melon’s message was the opposite of the radical 
(moral and economic) critique of Colbert’s pro-manufacturing policies, which was most 
famously expressed by Fénelon, in his Les avantures de Télémaque, fils d’Ulysse (1699).10 
Fénelon proposed a set of reforms that reinstalled a more natural economy, based on agricultural 
productivity, and reduced the inequality of social status introduced by luxury to a mere difference 
of people’s natural capabilities. Arguing against this heavily moralising type of argument, Melon 
had reconsidered what went wrong under Louis XIV and drew the conclusion that Colbert’s pro-
luxury economic policies had not necessitated conquest (as Colbert’s critics argued), but rather 
mitigated the disastrous effects of Louis’ territorial military strategies.11 
Criticising the way in which governments in modern Europe mixed power politics and 
political economy, Melon argued that modern forms of imperialism as means to increase power 
and wealth were as self-defeating in the modern world as purely military conquest. Instead, 
national governments had to focus on their domestic economies. Thus, on Melon’s principles, 
states in the modern world were much more equal than before, when power still ruled wealth.12 
Their future depended on whether politicians managed to induce a popular ‘spirit of commerce’ 
[l’esprit du commerce].13 
Melon also made clear that commercial development required decisions about its 
direction. In his view, the supply of agricultural goods was the basis of any national economy.14 
But, because the growth of agricultural productivity was related to natural resources and 
therefore strongly limited, it could not be the foundation of superior national wealth. In the 
modern world competition between states revolved around the productivity increases and 
technological development of manufacturing industries. Such competition inevitably caused 
luxury and inequality within societies.15 
Furthermore, to lift France out of its dire debts situation and boost economic growth, 
                                                          
9 JEAN-FRANCOIS MELON, Essai politique sur le commerce, nouvelle edition ([Paris], 1736). 
10 FRANÇOIS DE SALIGNAC DE LA MOTHE FÉNELON, Telemachus, Son of Ulysses (ed. & trans. Patrick Riley, 
Cambridge, 1994 [1699]). For the wider movement that Fénelon was part of see L. ROTHKRUG, Opposition to 
Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton, 1965). 
11 See I. HONT, Chapter 14, ‘Luxury and Commerce’, in Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political 
Thought (eds. M. Goldie & R. Wokler, Cambridge, 2005). 
12 For the wider context of this debate, see the introduction of I. HONT, Jealousy of Trade: International 
Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge MA, 2005). 
13 MELON, Essai politique sur le commerce, ch. 1, 3-11.   
14 Ibid. ch. 1-3. 
15 Ibid. ch. 9. 
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 Melon proposed a devaluation of the currency. He argued that the government of a state that was 
facing a great public debt (such as France at the time) might consider taking recourse to 
devaluationist measures in order directly to relieve its debt and to provide the economy with a 
boost that was generated through the redistributive effects of debt cancellation caused by a 
change of the nominal value of money.16 
Melon’s ideas were the outcome of a reconsideration of the options for reform in the 
aftermath of the crisis following the collapse of John Law’s Mississippi scheme. Yet, his 
interventionist proposal reminded many of Colbert’s policies. This, in combination with his 
defence of luxury, meant that it was no surprise that Melon was seen across Europe as a neo-
Colbertist in the worst sense of the word. Critics, initially Dutot and Pâris-Duverney, regarded his 
policy views as favouring the outright manipulation of people’s capacities to provide for their 
subsistence. 
Melon’s Essai politique was criticised first by Dutot, in his Réflexions politiques sur les 
finances et le commerce (1738) and then by Joseph Pâris-Duverney’s Examen du livre intitulé 
Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (1740).17 Both authors opposed 
devaluations as unjust and damaging to the economy and the state. Dutot suggested sumptuary 
laws as an alternative to Melon’s proposals. However, from Melon’s point of view, sumptuary 
laws restricted those passions that were ultimately responsible for the acceleration of economic 
productivity. Pâris-Duverney, in turn, criticised Dutot. He believed Dutot’s attack on Melon was 
a pretext for a general refutation of the French ‘ancienne Finance’ system and a defence of 
Law’s project. Dutot’s views, he argued, could not be reconciled with a critique of Melon. 
 
Set in motion by Melon and his critics, the debate on devaluation, as a means by which 
governments could influence debt payment within their states and thereby perhaps boost their 
economies, spread across Europe. The chapters 12 until 20 of his Essai politique sur le commerce 
added a new dimension to the existing debate about economic reform and turned devaluation 
policies into one of the most hotly debated issues during the late 1730s and 1740s, in France as 
well as the rest of Europe.18  
                                                          
16 Ibid. ch. 12-20. 
17 PIERRE DUTOT, Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (The Hague, 1738). JOSEPH PÂRIS-
DUVERNEY, Examen du livre intitulé Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (Paris, 1740). 
18 See HONT, Luxury, A.E. MURPHY, ‘Canons in monetary orthodoxy and John Law’, in: Contributions to the 
History of Economic Thought (eds. A.E. Murphy & R. Prendergast, London, 2000), pp. 294-317. For the 
influence in Italy of Melon see V. FERRONE, The intellectual roots of the Italian Enlightenment (New Jersey, 
1995), pp. 224-8, 234. 
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 When this debate became influential across Europe, the domestic positions of authors 
who engaged in these debates were interpreted as directly representing general political 
ideologies about commerce. This was the case as well in Italy where the mainstream of political 
economists tried to develop coherent theoretical positions on the value of money that celebrated 
the benefits of economic growth, but at the same time rejected luxury, as a moral danger to any 
state’s long-term economic development and political strength.19 These Italian authors preferred 
agricultural productivity increase to the use of financial policies, and saw Locke and Dutot as the 
standard bearers of good political economy. Similarly, they considered Melon’s Essai politique 
sur le commerce, which brought into focus the positive effects of devaluation policies, to be 
advocating forms of political abuse of markets that ultimately had to be self-defeating. Yet, as 
everyone understood, this dividing line, between critics and advocates (under particular 
circumstances) of devaluation policies, represented a more fundamental ideological schism about 




2. A cosmopolitan vision of an economic world order 
Among the Italian critics of Melon was Pompeo Neri (1706-1776), a prominent lawyer and 
government official from Tuscany, who became famous for his role in the census reform in 
Lombardy in the years after 1750. Neri, born in Florence, studied at the University of Pisa, where 
he became a lecturer of public law. After having served from 1735 until 1748 in Tuscany as a 
civil servant, he moved to Milan to accept office under Maria Theresa’s Austrian government 
over Lombardy. As the Presidente del ufficio del censimento, Neri immediately became a key 
figure in a major fiscal and administrative reform.20 In 1758, Neri moved back to Tuscany, to 
serve as Consigliere di reggenza per le finanze under Peter Leopold. In Tuscany he was 
responsible, again, for a census reform. Yet, his main achievement was the design of a set of laws 
that liberalised the grain trade. In support of the reform, Neri published his Discorso sopra la 
materia frumentaria, in 1767, his main work on economic development. Neri’s reforms revolved 
                                                          
19 See also Italy’s literary journals of the time. The Novelle letterarie and the Giornale della letteratura italiana 
published long reviews of French and English works, like the French translation by Silhouette of Warburton’s 
critique of Mandeville, that dealt with luxury, commerce and morality. See VIERI BECAGLI, ‘L’economia nei 
periodici del granducato di Toscana. La prima reggenza lorenese (1737-65)’, Riviste di economia in Italia (1700-
1900) (eds. Massimo M. Augello, Marco Bianchini, Marco E.L. Guidi, Milan, 1996), pp. 69-88. 
20 See his work of 1750, NERI, Relazione dello stato in cui si trova l’opera del censimento universale del ducato 
di Milano nel mese di maggio dell’anno 1750 (Milan, 1750). 
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 around the idea that agricultural development was the key to economic regeneration.21 This idea, 
which harked back to Sallustio Bandini’s Discorso sopra la Maremma di Siena of 1737, 
influenced Neri’s views on money. In 1751, so during his time in Milan, Neri published his 
Osservazioni sopra il prezzo legale delle monete, a work that has to be seen as a crucial statement 
in the context of a series of negotiations with the court of Turin to form a ‘monetary union’.22 
The Prezzo legale delle monete also represent Neri’s general theory of commerce and politics. 
At the foundation of the work lay Neri’s theory of the value of money. Neri adopted the 
Aristotelean position that the value of money arose out of agreement among people to use gold 
and silver as representations of goods. ‘The metals chosen’ to be money enabled human beings to 
‘communicate their ideas to each other through weights of the materials.’ Money prevented a 
lapse into ‘the obscure and confused ancient language’ of the pre-commercial ‘infancy of the 
nations’, and thereby served the efficiency of people’s need satisfaction. According to Neri, 
precious metals fulfilled ‘this function’ as money purely by virtue of ‘the proportions of their 
quantity’.23 In this way, Neri put forward an idea of how quantities of gold, silver and bronze 
became perfect representations of the values of goods that people traded with each other. Money 
became an extrapolation of what Neri understood to be pure and true commerce. This was also 
Neri’s interpretation of Locke’s position. 
Neri argued that states could not arbitrarily fix the nominal value of money, but at their 
own expense. The authority over the true legal value of money rested forever with the whole of 
humankind, even after states became the official issuers of coins. Thus, commerce retained its 
own supra-national character, in spite of any political dimension. Neri considered the popular 
argument that altering the proportion between the value of gold and silver served to avoid the 
export of money from a country and argued that if one ‘left the proportion at its natural course, 
without imposing laws to commerce, one would not lose the metals’. Commerce itself ‘served as 
a thermometer’ that was ‘highly sensitive’ and ‘readjusts by itself the proportion without any 
need for laws’. If money became scarce, the price of money would rise, which kept the money 
from being exported.24  
The idea that national civil laws were not suitable for fixing monetary relations, reflected 
                                                          
21 On Neri, see the obituary published by the NOVELLE LETTERARIE, reprinted in Scrittori Classici Italiani di 
Economia, Edizione moderna (ed. by P. Custodi, Milan, 1804), pp. vi-xvi, F. Venturi’s introductory note in F. 
VENTURI, Illuministi Italiani, III, Riformatori Lombardi, Piemontesi e Toscani (Milan-Naples, 1958) pp. 945-50, 
WAHNBAECk, Luxury and Public Happiness, pp. 103-4, A. FRANTOIANNI & M. VERGA, Pompeo Neri: atti del 
colloquio di Castelfiorentino (Castelfiorentino, 1992). 
22 POMPEO NERI, ‘Osservazioni sopra il prezzo legale delle monete’, in Scrittori Classici Italiani di Economia, 
Edizione moderna (ed. by Custodi, Milan, 1804 [1751]). 
23 Ibid. pp. 134-8. 
24 Ibid. pp. 38-41. 
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 Neri’s cosmopolitan idea of the true nature of commerce. Neri believed that in a modern 
‘commercial nation, everyone who did not live in solitude’ had ‘his interest linked to foreigners’. 
The natural ‘universal commerce of mankind’ united ‘the whole society of mankind’ into ‘one 
single universal republic’.25 This understanding of the nature of commerce reflected Neri’s belief 
in that the natural objective of commerce was the satisfaction of people’s true physical needs, 
rather than their acquired luxurious desires. Commerce connected people all over the world in a 
universal society which had precedence over political societies. 
However, the naturally beneficent relation between universal commerce and money had 
been disturbed, Neri believed, by the eighteenth-century world trade in gold and silver. These 
metals, especially silver, were still imported in large quantities from South-America and again, 
especially silver, were exported in large quantities to Asia. This type of trade, which had nothing 
to do with what Neri considered real commerce, but was inspired by political greed, had already 
ruined the power and wealth of Spain and Portugal (as was generally accepted at the time). 
Moreover it confused proper markets. International trade in precious metals led to 
misrepresentations of the true legal value of gold and silver in relation to each other across the 
world. Referring to Dutot’s tables in his Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce, 
Neri argued that in Spain this proportion was too high, in countries that concentrated on the Asia 
trade (England, France, the United Provinces) it was too low. Thus, treating gold and silver as 
real goods disturbed the efficiency of markets, impeded real commerce, and made money a less 
good instrument for coordinating the processes of economic development than it ought to be by 
its own nature.26 
As a potential way to overcome the effects of imperialistic trade by European states, Neri 
considered the possibility of establishing a concordat between Princes over the value of money. 
This, Neri realised, required the type of ‘European diet’ that the abbé de Saint-Pierre had 
proposed in his plan to reach eternal peace, in which all states gave up their primitive hunger for 
power. What Neri had in mind was not the establishment of a fixed legal value by fiat, such as 
people had misinterpreted Aristotle, in order to use his theory to defend political alterations of the 
value of money. Instead, there should be agreement on, and shared appreciation of, the fact that 
the establishment of purer, more efficient, forms of commerce was possible if states changed 
their financial policies.27 
                                                          
25 Ibid. pp. 121, 40. 
26 Ibid. pp. 64, 55-6, 36, 45-51. 
27 Ibid. pp. 44, 49-50, for the passages on Saint-Pierre. Here Neri also referred to Scaruffi (see footnote 44). See 
pp. 119, 327-353 for the sections on Aristotle. Here Neri defended the theories of the ancient jurisconsults, as 
opposed to Roman practice, notably the devaluation of the asse. 
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 With regard to devaluation policies, another biting critique emanated from Neri’s views 
on modern commercial politics. Neri believed that all reforms that interfered with the economy 
were political attempts to manipulate the commerce of the human race for the sake of reaching 
global hegemony. Neri regarded pro-luxury policies and a willingness to consider inflationary 
recoinages as morally depraved neo-Colbertist views that sustained ‘jealousy of trade’, as Hume 
famously called the dominant form of competition between states. On the other hand, Neri also 
regarded radical monetary reforms that counteracted luxury and economic inequality, such as 
Law’s système, as entirely unsuitable tools for restoring the state’s finances and inspiring 
people’s industriousness. These legitimate objectives required different reforms. Thus, Neri 
presented Melon and Law as fellow ‘projectors’ [progettisti] who lured governments with 
chimerical schemes offering them ‘lucrative prospects’.28  
In fact, devaluations disturbed people’s perception of the monetary value and were an 
‘attack’ on the ‘clarity’ of human interactions.29 Neri referred to John Locke’s contribution to a 
large English debate in the 1690s on inflationary recoinage.30 He cited Locke and agreed with 
Dutot’s criticisms of Melon that, through devaluation policies, ‘the law did [by authority] what 
clippers did tacitly.’31 Neri even argued that devaluations affected the well-being of humankind 
by relegating gold and silver to luxury goods. 
“As soon as money acquires some value unrelated to its quantity, that is, for its rarity, its 
antiquity or its particular beauty, it leaves the category of money and becomes a non-
exchangeable good; and who has found himself in countries where arbitrary price reductions 
have been practised, knows very well that they immediately stagnate the monetary system”.32 
Neri considered the utility of money purely related to it being a sign of wealth. It was true that 
people could easily value money like any other good, but this meant a degradation of the nature 
of money that affected its functioning as an institution that confirmed the unity of humankind. 
Inflationary recoinages had exactly this effect. Thus, Neri’s view of the coincidence of markets 
and sociability entailed an opposition between money (the conventional institution by which 
people took care of each other’s needs) and gold and silver having a value of their own (which 
was destructive to a natural commercial order aimed purely at direct needs satisfaction). 
                                                          
28 Ibid. p. 167. 
29 Ibid. pp. 140. 
30 See LOCKE, Locke on money. I will discuss Locke’s monetary theories in comparison to Galiani’s in the last 
section of this paper. 
31 NERI, ‘Prezzo legale delle monete’, p. 166. 
32 Ibid. p. 346. 
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 The political context for Neri’s cosmopolitan argument about commerce and his theory 
of money in his Prezzo legale delle monete was the proposal for an eighteenth-century Italian 
monetary union between Lombardy, Piemonte, and Neri’s own Tuscany.33 The plan entailed a 
unification of the coinage processes, for which a number of experiments (involving the 
refinement of the material and the cementazione) were performed, of which Neri reported the 
outcomes in his Prezzo legale delle monete. The idea of the monetary union was a reform plan 
which had as its purpose to make sure that the north of Italy would not slip back any further into 
a state of economic underdevelopment. By making sure that the prices of gold and silver in the 
whole region were accurate for a country that was not involved in the abusive trade of gold and 
silver one precondition would be created for triggering an economic regeneration, first of all by 
agricultural development. Neri hoped he could persuade the government in Turin. 
Neri’s reasoning was that if the abbé de Saint Pierre’s ‘European diet’ was impossible, 
states might still in their own interest accept the same monetary standards and regulations. Yet, 
with international values of gold and silver being influenced by the international trade in gold and 
silver this was an illusion. More realistic was the creation of such a unity in Italy alone. However, 
even this plan was criticised for being naïve. Girolamo Costantini, otherwise someone who 
shared Neri’s ideas, judged that it was a vain illusion to believe that governments would give up 
their sovereignty to join in a monetary union, whereas they had the responsibility to govern their 
own economies through monetary politics. The alternative was to restore the old values by 
recoining new money at the old standard, such as Locke had proposed in the English Recoinage 
Crisis of the 1690s.34 In any case, the Piedmontese government was not persuaded by Neri’s 
arguments and decided to maintain their own standards, in order to be able to profit financially 
from the geographical advantage of being placed in between France and the rest of Italy. Under 
Carlo Emmanuel III, the Kingdom of Sardegna instead chose to carry out a major recoinage of 
the present coin and clean the monetary system that had existed since the great monetary 
unification of Piedmontese currencies in 1717.35 Simultaneously, in Piemonte, bills of credit, 
which had been introduced for the first time in 1746, were seen as the future of monetary 
reforms.36 Thus, Neri’s cosmopolitan vision was disrupted. 
 
Neri’s plans were supported, in practice as well as theoretically, by Gian Rinaldo Carli (1720-
                                                          
33 See VENTURI, ‘Il dibattito sulle monete’, pp. 468-72. 
34 Ibid. pp. 513-4. 
35 See FELLONI, Il mercato monetario in Piemonte nel secolo XVIII, for the reforms of 1755, pp. 3-8, 97-9, 108-
11, 152-3, 239-43. 
36 For the reforms of 1746, ibid. pp. 7, 171-94. See also VENTURI, ‘Il dibattito sulle monete’, p. 473. 
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 1795). Carli studied in Padua, where he dedicated himself to a large variety of subjects and 
became a scholar of classical antiquity. In 1744 he became a professor of nautical science and 
astronomy, before he moved to Turin in 1753, and immediately thereafter to Milan, where he 
immediately became friends with Pompeo Neri; an intellectual and political friendship which 
resulted in 1754 in the publication of the first volume of Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, of 
which a first part had already been published, in Venice, in 1751. In 1764, after completing his 
work on money and various other economic writings (e.g. Saggio politico ed economico sopra la 
Toscana fatto nell’anno 1757, and a moral treatise Istituzione civile, ossia elementi di morale per 
la gioventù, published in 1754), Carli was elected by the court of Vienna Presidente del Supremo 
Consiglio di Economia, over his competitor, and later rival, Pietro Verri. From 1771 onwards he 
became Presidente of the new Magistrato Camerale, until 1780.  
As a government official Carli took part in the census reform and continued to play an 
important role in the field of financial politics following the failed attempt to establish an Italian 
monetary union. After publishing his earlier works on money in the context of Neri’s plan for a 
monetary union, in later years Carli would design new proposals for the reform of the Lombard 
currency system, e.g. in his Osservazioni preventive al piano intorno alle monete di Milano 
(1766), which was followed in 1776 by a new reform proposal for the cleansing of the money 
supply, dedicated to the State Chancellor, Kaunitz.37 In those years Carli contributed to the 
journal Il Caffè led by Pietro Verri. His most famous article, of 1765, was the patriotic manifesto 
Della patria degli italiani, which Verri intensely disliked. Carli, in turn, wrote a number of 
critical notes of Verri’s Meditazioni sull’economia politica, which were published anonymously 
in 1774. Retired from service in the administration, Carli still produced a number of books. He 
returned to the favourite subject of his youth in his Antichità italiche (1788-1790), and, 
interestingly, published his Della disuguaglianza fisica, morale e civile degli uomini (1794), a 
major moral philosophical critique of neo-Hobbesian arguments in Rousseau, whom Carli 
accused of not having understood anything of equality in antiquity. 
Carli was a cosmopolitan reformer who shared the same ideological affinities with Neri. 
Yet, although he believed that free grain trade was crucial for economic development and that 
agricultural productivity was key, he disagreed with the physiocrats’ idiosyncrasies and their 
moralising dogmatism. Similarly, Carli rejected radical egalitarianism as a political option. In 
sum, Carli was, like Neri, an economist-politician who held a number of moderately conservative 
notions of the nature of commerce. These notions one finds expressed in Carli’s works on money, 
                                                          
37 Both published with CARLI, Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, pp. 5-180. 
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 where they served to support, first, Neri’s proposal for monetary unity, and later ideologically 
similarly oriented reforms.38 
In the opening lines of Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia Carli defined money as the 
‘soul of society’ and ‘the chain connecting all nations’.39 The existence of money was upheld by 
the rules of the society of humankind, not by those of any single republic. At first, before money 
existed, men used silver and gold not for the satisfaction of their natural appetites, but for the 
adornment of their women and children (they brought social status). Yet, once these metals 
became money they started to serve the true commerce of mankind.40 Neri emphasised that 
throughout history states had often tried to hide from these commercial mechanisms, and ‘close 
the gates to money’. Sparta, the Hebrew Republic of Israel, as well as Rome at various stages, 
tried to promote frugality and suppress inequality by means of sumptuary laws and by only 
allowing bronze metal to be a medium of exchange. Yet, these measures were at the expense of 
these states themselves. If gold and silver were not allowed to be a national money, there could 
be no commerce and no development of the arts, Carli judged.41 At the same time, even these 
nations had some form of foreign trade, in which gold and silver had by then become the 
standard means of payment. In this early ancient context one single international monetary 
system had emerged where local appreciations of gold and silver converged into one standardised 
set of ideas of the value of money; simultaneously, local economies became interlocked in one 
system of global commerce. With this system in place, once particular states chose to alter the 
official value of either of these metals in relation to each other, other states would profit from 
their costly mistake.42 Carli linked the collapse of the ancient Israel and even of the Roman 
Empire, far more directly than was usual at the time, to the abuse of the money by the rulers of 
these states.43 Subsequently, he connected these abuses to the time of Louis XIV and Colbert, in 
order to argue that the same mistakes that were made in antiquity were the one that were made by 
modern states that tried to manipulate the true orders of commerce in order to obtain power over 
other states. The message was that devaluations were not only no real option for curing debts and 
                                                          
38 On Carli, see the biograpies in Custodi’s Scrittori Classici: CARLI, Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, pp. 5-
12, by FRANCO VENTURI in Illuministi Italiani, III, Riformatori Lombardi, Piemontesi e Toscani (Milan-Naples, 
1958) pp. 419-37, and the slightly less reliable one by SERGIO ROMAGNOLI in Illuministi settentrionali (Milan, 
1962), pp. 1001-18. There are a few notes on Carli in WAHNBAECK, Luxury and Public Happiness, pp. 92, 146-
7, 160, 172. See also various pages in F. VENTURI, Settecento riformatore, Da Muratori a Beccaria, in the 
chapter on Il Caffé. 
39 CARLI, Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, p. 15. 
40 Ibid. pp. 36, 19-20. 
41 Ibid. pp. 42-68. 
42 Ibid. pp. 70-92 
43 Ibid. pp. 107-15. 
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 restoring the balance of trade, but were also morally wrong. Carli criticised Melon and praised 
Locke for correcting the English monetary system.44 
In a slightly different way from Neri, Carli rejected the idea that all states might join in a 
league where they agreed on the values of gold and silver, as a result of which true commerce 
would be served better by a purer, a-political monetary system. Whereas Neri believed that Saint 
Pierre’s ‘European diet’ was to be hoped for, even though it was not realistic to expect states to 
join such a league at the time, Carli thought the very idea was ‘chimerical and absolutely useless’ 
just like ‘the German diet and the Italian diet proposed by Scaruffi45 were useless’. Because the 
real values of the metals was in a perennial flux ‘the power to fix the terms of the proportion 
between the metals is not in the hands of anyone’.46 
Thus, what ought to be done, which was what Neri’s proposals came down to, was to 
make sure that the values of gold and silver money were at the exact level at which they ought to 
be in a state that aimed at developing its domestic market and its potential for foreign trade in 
accordance with the true nature of commerce. In other words, a state whose commerce was 
completely separate from the type of trade that Europe’s dominant states engaged in by means of 
colonisation, trade companies, protectionism, financial schemes and building up public debts. In 
order to revive the Lombard economy in this particular way Carli himself launched various 
proposals that had as their objective the cleansing of the monetary system in Milan.47 
Carli’s views of the history of Italy’s economic decline were coloured by his moral ideas 
about economic development. According to Carli, the old system of economic and political 
organisation that brought Italy glory in the time of the Renaissance was still alive and impeded 
the growth of commerce. Instead, it promoted feudalism and had caused the contemporary 
situation in which Italy’s main foreign commerce was the ‘commerce of warfare’; local 
economies appeared to benefit from the money that warfare drew to Italy, which had a positive 
effect on the balance of trade, but this in fact hampered normal economic growth.48 Thus, from 
Carli’s point of view, Italy was still paying the price of mixing luxury commerce and the warfare 
of the crusades in the Renaissance. Rather than to repeat the same errors by joining the quest for 
                                                          
44 Ibid. pp. 116-7, 120, 49-50, 155-8, 219. See p. 147 for praise of Locke, repeated in CARLI, Osservazioni of 
1766, see CARLI, Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, p. 8. 
45 In G. SCARUFFI, Alitinonfo, of 1582, which had just been republished in De Monetis Italiae, (eds. F. Argelati 
& C. Casanova, IV, Milan, 1752. Scaruffi’s work was reprinted, more recently, in Economisti del cinque e 
seicento (ed. Graziani, A., Bari, 1913). 
46 CARLI, Delle monete e delle zecche d’Italia, p. 248.  
47 Ibid, pp. 5-180. 
48 Ibid. pp. 357-66. 
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 commercial empire, it was crucial to concentrate on the real development of the economy, and 
turn one’s back on the dominant mode of commercial politics in Europe. 
 
 
3. The history of commerce and the critique of the Aristotelean theory of money  
The historical perspective of commercial politics that Neri and Carli developed was not the only 
available one. There was at least one possible alternative approach to the history of commerce, 
from which the economic decline of Italy could be considered in a rather different light. In 1751, 
in Florence, Giovanni Francesco Pagnini (1715-1789) and Angelo Tavanti (1714-1782) 
published a translation of Locke’s writings on money.49 Both authors were government ministers 
in the grand duchy of Tuscany, where they held offices in the field of financial administration. 
Pagnini was born in Volterra, and wrote, besides on various erudite subjects, several works in 
economic history. Tavanti, who came from Arezzo, was a lawyer who became the secretary of 
the Consiglio delle Finanze, under Francis Stephen, and served as director of the Segreteria delle 
Finanze, as well as Consigliere interno di Stato, under Peter Leopold. In the latter function he 
was responsible for a custom tax reform. 
By publishing Locke’s works on money in Italian, Pagnini and Tavanti made available to 
an Italian audience a structured version of what had originally been a few long letters, written to 
give advice on a specific issue that belonged to late seventeenth-century English politics. Yet, in 
the following decades Locke’s letters had risen to fame abroad, where a myth had been formed of 
Locke as the defender of an honest commercial order of humankind. If Locke’s letters contained 
a general message about commercial politics, the work by Pagnini and Tavanti was supposed to 
bring it out. This was the same project that the Neapolitan Ferdinando Galiani had embarked on 
in the mid 1740s.50 Yet, whereas Galiani abandoned the project, because he increasingly found he 
disagreed with Locke, Pagnini and Tavanti completed the work a few years later. 
Thus, Pagnini and Tavanti considered whether the gap that Locke had left in his 
Treatises of Government, of 1690, when he touched upon the issues of the origin, morality and 
functions of money and inequality (in the famous chapter V of the second treatise), could be 
filled by inserting ideas from Locke’s slightly later letters on money. This did not mean that 
Pagnini and Tavanti shared all of Locke’s ideas. In fact, their disagreement with Locke in places 
makes for an interesting comparison between Pagnini and Neri and Carli. It is tempting to regard 
                                                          
49 JOHN LOCKE, Ragionamenti sopra la moneta, l’interesse del danaro, le finanze e il commercio. Tradotti la 
prima volta dall’inglese con varie annotazioni e con un discorso sopra il giusto pregio delle cose e della moneta 
e il commercio dei romani (eds. & intr. Giovanni Francesco Pagnini & Angelo Tavanti, Florence, 1751). 
50 GALIANI, Della moneta, pp. 307. 
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 the Florentine project on Locke as a deliberate counter project to Neri’s and Carli’s works. 
Tuscany was a projected partner in the Milanese scheme of an Italian monetary union, and 
Pagnini and Tavanti were government officials who dealt with the issue. The Florentine 
publication of Locke’s letters, in the same year as Neri’s Prezzo legale delle monete came out, 
presented a set of moderately divergent ideological views from the ones that inspired the 
initiative that came from Lombardy. 
In an essay appended to the translation of Locke’s texts, entitled Saggio sopra il giusto 
pregio delle cose, la giusta valuta della moneta e sopra il commercio dei Romani,51 Pagnini, like 
Neri, described ‘commercial society’ as ‘a type of society’ that created ‘universal’ ties between 
people and which was ‘supereminente’ – it transcended all categories of political power. This 
type of society emerged when, in the course of history, the ‘needs and desires of people’ 
extended, and more people, as well as more complicated organisational structures were necessary 
to satisfy them. This was the occasion on which a ‘new sort of society [..] was formed between 
people far away from each other’ who were already ‘reunited by the universal of their relations in 
various different bodies and societies’.52 Pagnini also saw Dutot and Locke as the standard 
bearers of good fiscalism and advocates of a world order of peaceful commerce. He agreed that if 
rulers changed the nominal value of money this often was at their own expense, rather than that it 
repaired any problems, and might even be considered at odds with the universal laws of 
commercial society.53 
However, Pagnini approached modern commerce, differently from Neri and Carli, as the 
outcome of the political dynamic in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire and the 
dissolution of the feudal system. One of the starting points of Pagnini’s introduction to Locke’s 
writings was a comparison between Roman and modern commerce. Pagnini judged that in 
antiquity rulers had much more authority over the value of money. Because states were not 
interlocked in a global economic network, devaluations for example could have their desired 
domestic political effects (debt cancellation) without damaging the states position internationally 
through the balance of trade. In those times, Pagnini suggested, commerce was a very different 
thing.54 In fact, ancient politics did not revolve around commerce, but around warfare. In the 
Roman Empire, the whole culture, education, and economy (Pagnini discussed the grain 
                                                          
51 G. F. PAGNINI, ‘Uno Discorso sopra il Giusto Pregio delle Cose, e della Moneta e il Commercio de’ Romani 
da G.F. Pagnini,’ in: Scrittori Classici Italiani di Economia (ed. P. Custodi, vol. II, Milan, 1806 [1751], pp. 155-
315. 
52 Ibid. pp. 160-3. 
53 Ibid. pp. 200-8. 
54 Ibid. pp. 209-221. 
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 provisioning system) were geared towards territorial expansion. Pagnini described Roman 
government as contrary to commerce; rather than that it promoted economy and profit, it 
sustained a set of political preferences and the luxury consumption of a small elite. This 
pernicious style of government ultimately proved fatal to the state. Yet, in modern times such 
political abuse of commerce would be punished immediately, and states would not be able to 
become wealthy and powerful by means of warfare. As an indicator of the different type of 
aggressive competition between states then and in modern times Pagnini cited Montesquieu, who 
argued that ‘the Romans never knew jealousy of trade. They attacked Carthage as a rival nation, 
instead of as a commercial nation’.55 Thus, Pagnini criticised the Roman spirit of conquest and 
warfare. But when, in doing so, Pagnini echoed Melon’s dictum that the spirit of conquest and of 
commerce were mutually exclusive, he meant not, as Neri and Carli would have argued, that 
conquest was morally wrong, but instead that aggression in the modern world was simply a 
backfiring strategy for the acquisition of wealth and power.56 
Pagnini’s understanding of the nature of modern society was grounded on a historical 
theory of the rise of commerce after the collapse of the Roman Empire. The feudal system that 
replaced Roman supremacy was disorganised, weak and divided. These were no conditions for 
commerce to flourish, as there was not the degree of security that trade required. However, as a 
side-effect of the crusades, formerly divided rulers suddenly found themselves together up 
against a common enemy in Asia, which in Europe resulted in peace, lawfulness and new modern 
politics of commerce. After Charles V had brought Europe together under one universal 
monarchy the political side of this commercial unity slowly disintegrated and competition 
between states hardened.57 Nevertheless, Pagnini accepted the modern world as it was. Desire for 
political supremacy and ambition had not disappeared, but in the modern world commercial 
activity had replaced warfare as the means by which hegemony could be established. At least, 
commercial competition did not require bloodshed.  
These were ideas that Neri could not accept. Pagnini, in contrast to Neri, had, however, 
at the beginning of his introductory essay already defined the relation between political society 
and universal commercial society differently from Neri. Pagnini argued that political societies 
had the same purpose (rather than opposite ones) as cosmopolitan social interaction: to bring 
together people with the same interests under the same laws. Commercial interaction in a supra-
national sphere was complementary to ‘the provincial society of the nation and the kingdom’.58 
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 To underline the way in which the laws of commerce complemented the laws of political 
societies, Pagnini stated that ‘because the governments of our time can no longer derive the same 
advantages from war, they have the orders of commerce as their object’.59 The way in which 
commerce changed the world ‘obliged’ governments ‘to compete with others for the society of 
commerce, in order to attain their own conservation, their wealth and power’.60 Whereas strategy 
used to be crucial in warfare, now ‘one watches with the same eyes at those citizens who by 
means of arts and manufactures, no less than soldiers, contribute to’ the conservation of the state. 
This new international order had civilised humankind in all its aspects.61 It was in the interest of 
states to pursue ‘not the maximum extension of one’s territory, but the maximum of people 
engaged in the arts and manufacturing industry’ as this ‘constitutes the force and wealth of the 
state’.62 
The decay of Spain and Portugal were a case in point of what happened if one did not 
manage to adapt to the modern world and kept confusing conquest and commerce. Pagnini gave 
an economic explanation for why Spain and Portugal were the new Rome. The import of gold 
and silver had drive price levels up to a degree that it became impossible for domestic industries 
to compete internationally. In his discussion of the fate of Spain Pagnini followed (and referred 
to) Hume’s analysis.63 
In fact, Pagnini’s entire historical analysis of history of commerce was the same type of 
analysis that writers like Melon, Montesquieu and also David Hume had made. Such an analysis 
entailed a notably different outlook on the relation between politics and commerce from Neri’s. 
Pagnini allowed himself to treat of commerce as a historical phenomenon; commerce was where 
human nature and political necessity came together, so to say, rather than an ideal image of 
humankind united directly for the purpose of universal need satisfaction. Consequently, by 
recognising that modern commerce emerged within the contingencies of power struggles between 
feudal rulers and, later, absolutist monarchs, it was much easier for Pagnini to accept the divisive 
aspects of commerce itself, rather than to ascribe them to the political abuse of commerce. For 
Pagnini, unlike Carli and Neri, commerce was not simply the eternal universal means by which 
humanity united. 
In that sense, Pagnini also realised that the nature of commerce could not so easily 
directly be related to the satisfaction of bare physical needs. Referring to Hobbes’s definition of 
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 commercium in De Cive (first published in 1642), he argued that people not only wanted to 
preserve themselves, but also to obtain profit and glory and possess luxury goods.64 Based on the 
spread of personal interests, which themselves were ‘the objects of relations’ between people, the 
natural unity of the family turned into a different sort of entity whose coherence rested on 
individual interests.65 
“These [shared objects of interest] being first gathered by persons of only one family, there was no 
other society of any sort, apart from this one; then they were passed on to cities, they permeated the 
nations and finally they spread among the whole immense cycle where needs, desires, avarice and 
luxury extended commerce”.66 
Pagnini did not see humankind as either naturally inclined, or easily persuaded politically, to act 
in markets that were geared only towards the preservation of the human race, which Neri and 
Carli saw as the main function of markets. The point that represented their differences was the 
fact that Pagnini’s theory led to gold and silver being recognised as luxury goods with a value 
independent of their use as money. This idea of Pagnini undermined the validity of the critique of 
devaluation that Neri put forward, because Neri based himself there on his theory of the value of 
money. In contrast to Neri, Pagnini recognised that the value of gold and silver as luxury goods 
was more fundamental than their value as money; when silver and gold became money, they 
were still luxury goods, rather than that humankind shook off its earlier mistakes and invented a 
means by which they communicated ideas of value to each other. These views of Pagnini stood in 
stark contrast with Neri’s outlook on commerce. 
Thus, Pagnini saw money as the agency that brought order in a world in which states 
competed with each other to bend the balance of power to their advantage and in which people 
tried to distinguish themselves from others. Pagnini’s idea of the history and nature of 
commercial societies spilled over into his ideas on international politics. He realised that 
commercial competition took place according to specific rules and that regulating its monetary 
dimension would require entirely different institutional solutions from ones that were designed to 
limit conquest. Pagnini did not claim to have a solution, but he pointed to the fact that commerce 
created international orders that effectively were confederations. This had happened in ancient 
Greece and at various other moments in history before and after the rise and fall of the Roman 
Empire.67 
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Parallel to the differences between Neri’s and Pagnini’s notions of commerce, the discussion in 
Italy in the early 1750s focussed on theories of the value of money in relation to the 
(il)legitimacy of devaluation policies. Virtually all Italian authors of the time agreed that Melon’s 
neo-Colbertist approach to devaluation and economic growth was wrong; that instead agricultural 
productivity increase was the key to a resurgence of the Italian states’ economies (which required 
institutional and tax reforms), and that agricultural development, in turn, would trigger the 
establishment of new industries and promoted the arts and exports. However, grounding their 
reform proposals on a solid foundation required a solid theory of money. 
At this point, a number of Neri’s Italian contemporaries questioned the validity of his 
distinction between money as a human invention and money as a (luxury) good, which as Neri 
had suggested, was created in modern times through political violation of the consensus of 
humankind. The attraction of this type of distinction was clear: it separated the goods gold and 
silver, which could not ‘satisfy the appetites by themselves’, from the institution that measured 
the value of really useful goods in relation to each other.68 But, as Pagnini saw it, the obvious fact 
that gold and silver could not themselves be consumed often turned too quickly into an 
Aristotelean theory of money, such as in Locke’s writings.69 Yet, such a theory left unexplained 
how quantities of gold and silver had in fact come to be generally accepted as representing goods. 
Thus, Pagnini compared Locke’s and Pufendorf’s theories of money with Aristotle’s and showed 
that not much theoretical progress had been made.70 Pagnini also noticed how authors like Locke 
aimed at putting together an argument that on the one hand rejected greed, luxury, inequality and 
people’s love of money, while money was also seen as the answer to the problem of uniting a 
divided mankind.71 Consequently, it was the case that their theories of money would end up 
looking very similar to the arguments (which were their ideological opposite) that defended 
devaluations on the basis of Aristotle’s definition of money as a legal agreement, which made 
determining and altering the nominal value of money a political privilege. Apparently, it was still 
too difficult to align the fact that a fundamentally divided humankind united by means of self-
interest with a realistic theory of money, even if the practice of human interaction had 
fundamentally changed since antiquity, as Pagnini had argued. 
In fact, not only Pagnini, but most participants in this Italian debate recognised the huge 
difficulties that existed if one wanted to develop a realistic theory of the value of money that 
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 reflected a moral defence of markets. Gianrinaldo Carli judged that this would be tantamount to 
the impossible job of reconciling Dutot’s ideas and Melon’s, which, Carli claimed, was what 
François Véron de Forbonnais had tried to do in his Elémens de commerce.72 
Another Italian commentator on these issues, the Tuscan lawyer Giovannantonio Fabrini, 
who published a work on money in Rome in 1750, saw himself confronted with this very 
problem. Fabrini agreed with Dutot and Locke (against Melon) on the moral and economic 
downsides of interventionist financial politics, but did not know how to construe a valid 
argument that proved this, for he first needed a proper theory of the value of money. Yet, no such 
theory existed, Fabrini found. He disagreed with Neri by asserting that money was essentially a 
good, even if human history had turned it into a special good, and that it never stopped primarily 
deriving its value from the ‘permutability’ of gold and silver against other goods. On top of that, 
Fabrini declared that Locke’s theory was chimerical and failed to explain how money, as a 
‘human invention’, functioned so perfectly and had such creative powers that it managed to 
transform ‘the primitive state of mankind’ into ‘the cultured and proper state in which we now 
live.’73 No one claimed to have a good alternative explanation. 
In that context, Neri attempted to save Aristotle’s theory (and Paul’s legislation) through 
an analysis of the ‘public’ nature of the consensus that gave gold and silver a value. The term 
‘public’, Neri stressed, denoted the natural rather than political character of the creation of 
money. This could be proven, Neri claimed, if Aristotle’s theory and those of the Roman 
jurisconsults were seen in terms of the law of nations, instead of as a product of civil law; that is, 
it regarded not one nation but ‘the public of all the nations that form the human species’.74 Neri’s 
defence of Aristotle’s theory of money along these fictional juridical lines was exactly what 
Fabrini had objected to. It did not provide the debate with an idea of money that served the wider 
issues of reform. The main Italian literary journal of the time, the Novelle letterarie, subscribed 
to Fabrini’s critique. Its editor, Giovanni Lami, agreed with Fabrini that money had to be seen as 
a good.75 In that context, Lami appreciated the fact that Aristotle’s theory of money was not 
actually meant to oppose money to goods (thereby giving rulers the authority to change the 
nominal value of money by fiat), but emphasised the contrast in economic efficiency between a 
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 household economy and chrematistics, because money somehow became a special good.76 Yet, 
neither Aristotle nor anyone else had ever sufficiently explained how money had become this 
special good, which was in fact the crucial point. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the absence of a satisfactory theory, the issue of the value of 
money had become the focal point of the Italian reform debate. The challenge identified by 
Fabrini of devising a proper theory of money represented the need among Italian eighteenth-
century political economists to construe a theory of commercial development that was an 
appropriate basis for the financial, agricultural and institutional reforms they supported. As long 
as the money debate was not resolved, the direction of reform policies, on which most Italian 
authors agreed by sharing the same ideological affinities, could not be fixed. What was lacking 
was a solid theoretical foundation that tied together the nature of money and the idea of 
commerce that these Italian writers preferred. 
 
 
4. A new commercial ideology: against moralistic reasoning in political economy 
Notwithstanding the fact that Neri’s and Carli’s cosmopolitan ideology of an economic world 
order had its theoretical imperfections, its critics were easily condemned for misunderstanding its 
true nature. The most contested contribution to the Italian devaluation controversy was 
Ferdinando Galiani’s anonymously published Della moneta (1751), which was an inquiry into 
the history, morals and politics of commercial society, as well as a treatise on money and 
financial politics. 
Ferdinando Galiani (1728-87), born in Chieti, was sent to Naples in 1735 to be educated 
by contacts of his uncle Celestino, who was the Capellano maggiore and head of the Neapolitan 
University.77 Among these contacts was Bartolomeo Intieri who, in the 1740s, began teaching 
Ferdinando and other promising youngsters in the field of political economy.78 Intieri admired 
Melon’s political economy, which, in the late 1730s, formed the inspiration for a moral and 
political vision he developed together with Celestino of how Naples could preserve its 
independence by developing a basis for foreign trade. In tune with his praise of Melon, Intieri 
was also critical of the ideas of nothern-Italian reformers, like Carli, Neri and Costantini, who 
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 Intieri considered ‘a school of barbaric men more ignorant than the night and more petulant, 
arrogant and disparaging than ignorance itself’.79 Inspired by Intieri, Ferdinando Galiani took 
lower church orders, in 1745, to accommodate his scholarly activities. In the following years he 
gave a number of lectures on various antiquarian and moral philosophical subjects. During this 
period, Ferdinando had secretly been working on a treatise called Dell’arte del governo, an 
overview of the ruling manners and institutions in human history as well as a theoretical analysis 
of the principles of government in relation to commerce. Della moneta was derived from this 
project, as Galiani’s response to the condition of the Neapolitan reform debate in the late 1740s. 
Galiani believed his Neapolitan contemporaries did not understand the nature of commerce and 
money well enough, which led them to misinterpret signs of economic development for causes of 
panic and radical interventionist measures. Della moneta was written to discipline this debate. 
Later, after having served as a diplomat in Paris for ten years, Galiani became famous as the 
author of the Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds (1770),80 a work commenting on arguably the 
most hotly debated policy issue of the eighteenth century, the liberalisation of the grain trade (the 
last serious attempt to prevent the French Revolution), in which he criticised the physiocrats.81 
Yet, as he himself testified, his political economy had been fully developed already by the time 
he wrote Della moneta.82 
Della moneta offered a reconsideration of Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce. 
Galiani claimed Melon’s book had ‘been read only to confute him by those whom heaven did not 
give the sharpness of mind to understand him.’83 Unsurprisingly, when Neri evaluated the 
positions adopted by all the Italian writers on money in the early 1750s, he noted that Galiani was 
the only one who ‘defended Melon’s sentiments on arbitrary devaluations of the price of money 
against the by now common opinion.’84 However, Neri was puzzled by how Galiani’s theoretical 
positions on money and commerce, which he believed did not significantly ‘disagree with the 
common opinion’, could be coherent with his tolerance towards Melon.85 In the same vein, 
Girolamo Costantini, declared: ‘I am convinced that any [..] follower of the opinion of Melon, 
like [..] the author of [..] Della moneta [..] will change sentiment and will eventually subscribe to 
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 the sacred and true defence of Locke and Dutot and many other worthy men, both foreigners and 
Italians’.86 
Thus, even his Italian critics recognised that Galiani was not sceptical about the 
beneficent character of modern commerce. Galiani’s positions were also by no means a defence 
of economic Machiavellianism (as Italian historians of political thought have argued), but rather 
a critique of it. On the other hand, his contemporaries were puzzled that Galiani could agree on 
so many points with Melon, whose outlook on the functioning of markets was filled with moral 
scepticism and whose politics clearly revived Colbertism. In fact, Galiani’s main contribution 
both to the devaluation controversy and to the general debate on economic reforms was to point 
out that many received views were mistaken because they derived from a moralistic perspective 
on commerce and political economy. To understand Galiani’s positions we need to go to the core 
of Della moneta and compare his theory of value with Locke’s. 
Book I, chapter 2, of Della moneta was the theoretical backbone of Galiani’s argument. 
Here he opposed Aristotle’s derivation of the institution of money from a social contract of 
mankind. Galiani questioned the view that ‘the common consensus of men caused them, for their 
greater convenience, to adopt the common use of money’ by ‘giving metals a value they do not 
intrinsically possess’.87 Instead, which ‘few understand’, it was the case, Galiani, declared, ‘that 
the just price and value of the metals has been fixed and firmly established by their very nature 
and by the disposition of human minds’.88 Galiani pointed to the fact that the obvious weakness 
of the Aristotelean theory was that it was both untrue and unrealistic in historical terms. 
“Where then were these congresses, those conventions of mankind; in which century, what place, 
who were the delegates, through whom the Spanish, the Chinese, the Goths and the Africans agreed 
on ideas which, for many centuries, even when peoples ignored each others existence, never 
changed? [..] When all people for many centuries share the same sentiment, this is not the result of 
deliberations or congresses held at the foot of the Tower of Babel or right after leaving Noah’s 
Ark”.89 
But Galiani’s more profound reason for rejecting Aristotle’s theory was that it opened the way to 
the principle that the value of money could be altered politically, by fiat.90 Here, Galiani was still 
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 on the same side as everyone else in the debate. However, Galiani noted that the influence of 
Aristotle’s principle was more pervasive than was commonly assumed. Even those who 
disagreed with the practice of rulers of changing the value of money failed to correct the basic 
Aristotelean mistake. 
“But these opinions cannot be contradicted without destroying their very basis. Hence I do not 
know, or even begin to understand, how it could be possible that such writers as John Locke, 
Davanzati, Broggia, Melon and Montesquieu, among others, could have had contrary sentiments 
so firmly established on so false a foundation, without ever denying the first principle. They were 
not aware either of the weakness of the latter or the instability of the former”.91 
This failure was the direct target of Galiani’s argument. He suggested that the real cause why the 
true principles of the value of money were never revealed was that other political theorists came 
to analyse its nature from distorting ideological perspectives. 
“It would be wrong to consider me responsible for revealing so great a truth, should anyone be 
inclined to do so. The responsibility belongs instead to the infinite number of writers who have 
either failed to understand this, or have not wished to demonstrate it”.92 
Unlike all other political writers before him, he claimed, Galiani set out to construct a theory of 
money that accepted the factual history of the institution of money. In the case of Locke, the 
ultimate reason for Galiani’s critique of Locke’s theory of money was the moral philosophy that 
lay behind it. Locke had argued in his famous chapter Of property that money was a sort of 
agreement and paved the way for economic growth. But he had also made strong assumptions 
about man’s moral being that Galiani rejected.  
Locke’s theory was in a complicated way related to his philosophy of the law of nature. 
According to Locke, the earth had been given to mankind in common. Before they created money 
people were unable to acquire more goods than they could use. Thus, the condition of common 
ownership under which God had placed mankind was monitored by the nature of creation. This 
changed when people among each other consented ‘tacitly and voluntarily’ to ‘the use of 
Money’.93 Gold and silver, previously virtually useless, came to represent goods and enabled the 
more industrious to become wealthier than the slothful or less talented. Locke, famously, was 
highly ambivalent about the consequences of the creation of money. Money unleashed man’s 
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 natural ‘desire of having more than’ he needed and it created luxury, which Locke loathed and 
regarded as utterly destructive to society.94 On the other hand, Locke believed that God intended 
mankind to cultivate the earth and live in ever more convenient ways.95 For Locke, economic 
development was justifiable as the product of both the way in which God created man and the 
way in which man developed himself within the boundaries of the law of nature. But the fact that 
Locke took this approach to justifying commerce was not by itself the reason why Galiani 
distanced himself from him. 
From the perspective on the law of nature that Locke set up in the Essay concerning 
human understanding it transpires that man’s task on earth is to develop the best possible 
understanding of God’s law of nature and to live in accordance with it. In that respect, for Locke, 
money and government were the vehicles by which mankind shaped the conditions within which 
each man should dedicate himself to obeying God’s law of nature. Accordingly, all of man’s 
pleasure-seeking was to be considered from this angle. In contrast, for Galiani the emergence of 
money and the moral properties of man’s value judgements were not in any way instrumental in 
the realisation of a moral objective. Instead, commerce had its own morality that already brought 
out precisely the way in which God had intended humankind to operate; there was no higher 
goal. Another difference was that whereas Locke’s social philosophy has been described as an 
‘applied theology’ that left open the possibility of politics grounded on true knowledge, Galiani’s 
theory of commercial sociability was profoundly sceptical about the relation between man’s 
moral beliefs and their epistemic content.96 According to Galiani shared beliefs were inevitably 
based on ‘self-deceit’.97 Therefore, it could not even be the case that people agreed on any 
institution in order to bring humankind closer to its true goal. But ultimately it was not the notion 
of agreement by itself that made Galiani reject Locke’s theory of money; it was the fact that the 
moral principles behind Locke’s theory of economic growth relegated it to a function of moral 
self-determination. 
Locke’s ideas about justice in relation to monetary politics differed from Galiani’s for 
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 similar reasons. In the chapter Of property, Locke insisted that money was ‘made practicable out 
of the bounds of Societie and without compact’.98 Thus, governments did not have jurisdiction in 
this field; it was a pure matter of pre-governmental, or extra-governmental, mutual trust. Only 
extreme necessity could justify meddling with monetary standards or otherwise intervening in the 
economy by altering money.99 Accordingly, in his letters on monetary politics written in the 
1690s Locke was adamant that debts had to be satisfied according to the standard and that 
devaluation policies, by changing the standard of the nominal value of money, destroyed public 
faith.100 People had consented to the creation of money and to the creation of government as 
institutions that shaped the environment within which man determined his own moral personality 
and his actions. It was inappropriate for governments to extend their mandate themselves beyond 
that which was given to them. In fact, in the worst case this could even cause a return to the state 
of nature.101 
Galiani did not disagree with Locke that only in cases of necessity should governments 
intervene with the functioning of money. But he conceptualised political justice in a very 
different way from Locke. The basis for his idea of political economy was his belief that it was 
impossible to improve the mechanisms of the self-regulating order of human passions and 
beliefs. The task of politics was to align itself with man’s utility-seeking. This was exactly what 
Galiani in the few pages of the manuscript that bears the title Dell’arte del governo 
recommended: ‘good government should sustain and promote the strongest and most universal 
pleasures’.102 The key for successful political economy was simply to abstain from imposing any 
moral constraints onto man’s natural utility-seeking or artificially to direct people’s efforts to 
certain political targets.  
However, in the case of necessity, which Galiani interpreted - much more broadly than 
Locke - as including the possibility of increasing the wealth of the state, or (which came down to 
the same thing) increasing its population, governments had to act. In such cases, justice was a 
mere political economic calculation that had no moral dimension other than that the good of the 
people was identical with the outcome of the calculation. Moreover, justice itself was an 
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 inadequate concept in some parts of political economy. Galiani held that, with regard to the 
payment of debts, ‘most writers’ believed that ‘restitution of the same weight is in conformity 
with natural justice’, whereas in fact ‘time renders the just unjust and transforms justice into 
injustice’.103 Similarly, under circumstances in which a devaluation was necessary everyone 
would accept it as justice.104 And when governments raised taxes these were only ‘just’ if they 
led to greater ‘tranquility’ and gave ‘sustenance’ to those who governed the people well. 
‘Tyranny’, the opposite of justice, Galiani defined as ‘poor rules by means of which riches are 
acquired by those who are either of no use to others or even harmful to them’. It was a ‘law of 
nature’, Galiani claimed, ‘that wealth must be obtained only by one who brings utility or pleasure 
to others’.105 
In Della moneta Galiani treated his theory of the value of money as a premise for his 
entire political economy. Galiani believed that money and modern commercial societies emerged 
as a result of a transformation process that turned people’s shared beliefs into configurations that 
made them predisposed to act as commercial beings. First silver and gold had religious and 
particular social meanings, which developed into ones that matched the culture of modern 
commercial societies. Such a theory was in tune with the history of mankind approach that the 
greatest European thinkers (like Montesquieu and Hume) were developing in those years, and 
which Pagnini too, for example, had adopted.106 Thus, Galiani also felt that commercial 
competition between states was to be accepted as the best possible form in which the whole of 
humankind interacted with each other.  
Rather than to impose any artificial moral constraints upon commerce, Galiani argued 
that commerce had its own morality, which by itself embodied the way in which God intended 
humankind to operate. Galiani’s theory of value revolved around his famous concept of utility, 
by means of which he justified pride, luxury and self-interest, in a neo-Hobbesian key: ‘Our 
passions are not only the desires to eat, drink, sleep. [..] Man is constituted in such a way that as 
soon as he has silenced one desire another pops up that motivates him with equal strength.’107 
Man’s utility judgements provided him with a yearning to ‘distinguish himself from others’. This 
passion was so strong that man often valued its gratification more than ‘the security of life 
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 itself.’108 Galiani called this passion amor proprio and argued that because of its ‘supremacy’ 
over all other passions it was man's ‘principle of action’.109 Rather than a source of moral 
corruption and social disintegration it was an innocent product of human nature: ‘if the feeling of 
pleasure derived from the reverence and esteem in which others hold us were to be ridiculed this 
would constitute a reproach against our nature, which created this disposition of mind, not us 
ourselves.’110 
Within this commercial order it was the case that gold and silver had a value because 
they were generally esteemed luxury goods that had risen to the status of money, because 
everyone recognised social status. As Galiani put it, gold and silver ‘are used as money because 
of their value, they do not have a value because they are used as money’.111 According to Galiani 
‘the good moral order of the universe’ was ‘completely maintained by money’ and the ‘Author of 
nature’ guarded over it.112 
None of this meant that commerce was immoral. Galiani argued that markets regulated 
their own moral dynamic. He claimed that ‘wealth does not fall to a person except as payment for 
the just value of his work’.113 Markets forced people to honestly use their talents in order to 
maximise their utility: thus, ‘men regard as meritorious only the use of the talents which one may 
have. Anything else will either not be virtuous or will not require any skills.’114 Eventually, 
Galiani concluded that the ulterior mechanisms of man’s utility-seeking ‘contain within them the 
ideas of justice and stability’.115 From his perspective, inserting the notion of agreement into a 
theory of value allowed people to impose mistaken moral principles onto political economy, 
which could only have negative effects on actual policies. Galiani believed that this was the case 
in the devaluation controversy as well. 
In his treatment of devaluations in book III of Della moneta Galiani refused to share in 
the general rejection of Melon’s views by his contemporaries, which, from his point of view, 
confused political economy and moral argument. To correct a great number of misconceptions 
about the effects of devaluations, Galiani gave a detailed analysis, based on his own theory of 
money, of what they actually were. Here, Galiani did not completely agree with Melon’s 
technical analysis of the effects of devaluationist policies either, but he shared most of his ideas. 
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 It was important to leave the option of taking recourse to inflationary policies open, Galiani 
concluded, since they had advantages over other alternatives once a state was in danger: ‘one will 
see that in certain circumstances, in certain times and places, […] the utility of a devaluation 
exceeds the damage’.116 Galiani considered devaluations ‘an affront committed upon nature 
which is rendered necessary by state calamities’.117 Compared with alternative options that a ruler 
might choose from in case of necessity – such as directly defaulting on the state’s debt or running 
up more public debt – devaluations had the advantage that the negative effects were rightly, that 
is progressively, spread out over the whole nation. Moreover, devaluations were slower and ‘less 
biting and clamorous’ than bankruptcy and less likely to incite ‘tumult and rebellion’.118 
Thus, Galiani did not believe monetary interventions were morally prohibitive on 
principle. In his view, international monetary regulation was not only not a possibility, but also 
not desirable. The authors who followed Locke, instead, would argue that money was agreed 
upon ‘out of the bounds of Societie’, which placed it outside the jurisdiction of governments. 
They felt that devaluations were simply unjust, only practised by abusive governments and were 
a legitimate source of resistance. Nevertheless, devaluations, Galiani argued at the end of his 
whole discussion of the subject, could only be allowed under exceptional circumstances of 
‘desperate necessity’.119 He feared situations in which ‘the coinage’ would be ‘tampered with 
without any necessity’, but was reassured by the virtue of his own King and ‘his grand and 
deserved good fortune’, which themselves would prevent Naples from arriving at ‘such a 
state’.120 Naples was fortunate in this respect because the King was not, as in other parts of Italy, 
deceived by mistaken ideas about commerce and its morality that inspired disastrous reform 
projects. 
One of the main reasons why bad reforms were in fashion, from Galiani’s point of view, 
was that people did not understand the true nature of monetised commerce. With regard to 
money, they were inclined, ever since money emerged, to imagine that they had invented it 
themselves for particular reasons. This was Galiani’s explanation of the persistent popularity of 
Aristotle’s theory of money. These imagined reasons for the invention of money were based on 
mistaken ideas of justice and, in turn, led both to a categorical rejection of devaluations and 
inspired a spirit of economic reforms that Galiani thought were dangerously naïve and a threat to 
Italy’s wealth and power. To get his message with regard the spirit of reforms in general across in 
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 the most provocative way, Galiani concluded Della moneta by appropriating the words of 
Petrarch that Machiavelli had used at the end of Il Principe: 
“It pains and distresses me that while the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily are rousing themselves 
and recovering with the help of their own sovereigns, the rest of Italy fails in insensible degrees 
from day to day, and declines. Although the signs of this decay are many, the greatest is, in my 
opinion, the endless discussion and the innumerable quantity and types of improvements, laws 
and institutions on government and trade, and on all the orders of the civil state – all so 
universally sought and competitively pursued. As in our older men, great ideas and a 
continuous, breathless pursuit, born of internal anguish and organic deterioration, are always 
indices of an imminent and irreversible end. And this to me is why it no longer seems possible 
to uphold the words of our ancient poet  
That the ancient valour 
In the Italians hearts is not yet dead 
But at the same time, I doubt that, finally, given peace, it will be necessary to say that 
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